Louis Menand’s “The Marketplace of Ideas: Reform and Resistance in the American University” (2010) questions why forms of higher education have been so intractable against change. One reason suggested is the surprising conservatism revealed of professors as a group, surprising because professors are often associated with more liberal stances and presumed to understand the connections between one’s views and why one might hold those views. Understanding and questioning one’s own assumptions and presuppositions are important antidotes to the poisons of propaganda. Menand describes the 2007 national survey conducted by Gross and Simmons of full time faculty members. Part time instructors were not included, a group that no doubt would have presented particular “methodological challenges” (134), because the adjunct does not share homogeneous characteristics to a group of tenured professors. In any case, more important to notes on a fantasy democracy is Menand’s reference to an older study of the population as a whole.
That study found that
“In the general population, most people do not know what it means to identify themselves as liberals or conservatives. People will report themselves to be liberals in an opinion poll and then answer specific questions with views normally thought of as conservative. People also give inconsistent answers to the same questions over time” (134 – 135).
In footnotes, Menand explains the primary sources of his research: “Gross and Simmons used a number of measures to confirm the self-reporting: for example, they correlated answers to survey questions about political persuasion and political party with views on specific issues, such as the war in Iraq, abortion, homosexual relations, and so on” (134), while in “the classic study [of the general population]…results have been much confirmed” (135). That study, by Philip Converse, titled “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,” was published in Ideology and Discontent, in 1964.
Why would the explanations of the average person on the street not correlate, be inconsistent, even incoherent? Menand says,
“This is because most people are not ideologues – they don’t have coherent political belief systems – and their views on the issues do not hang together. Their reporting is not terribly accurate” (135-136).
That they nevertheless vote for people and issues they think they understand but probably don’t might simply create some random noise in the results, filtered out by some law of large numbers; or, what we think of as our democracy is a kind of fantasy, but one that, like fantasy sports teams, is based on a reality, and can be a lot fun, lucrative, or provide for any number of teachable moments and lessons learned. Outcomes often include random or chance influence.
An example of the questioning of assumptions and presuppositions as important to understanding causal correlations can be found in Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the Twenty-First Century” (2014). At the end of his Introduction, Piketty says,
“The history of income and wealth is always deeply political, chaotic, and unpredictable. How this history plays out depends on how societies view inequalities and what kinds of policies and institutions they adopt to measure and transform them. No one can foresee how these things will change in the decades to come. The lessons of history are nevertheless useful, because they help us to see a little more clearly what kinds of choices we will face in the coming century and what sorts of dynamics will be at work….Since history always invents its own pathways, the actual usefulness of these lessons from the past remains to be seen. I offer them to readers without presuming to know their full import” (35).
Piketty’s primary statement, his argument, is expressed in a simple formula that illustrates a fundamental inequality in the creation and distribution of wealth that promotes ever greater risk of variance or disparity between the wealthy and the rest of society. The formula is
“r > g (where r stands for the average annual rate of return on capital, including profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other income from capital, expressed as a percentage of its total value, and g stands for the rate of growth of the economy, that is, the annual increase in income or output)” (25).
What happens when r is much greater than g? Piketty says that
“it is almost inevitable that inherited wealth will dominate wealth amassed from a lifetime’s labor by a wide margin” (26).
And what when that happens? The divergence of inequality reaches
“levels potentially incompatible with the meritocratic values and principles of social justice fundamental to modern democratic societies” (26).
In other words, inequality reaches such an extreme that democracy is at risk of becoming a fantasy. There is of course much more to Piketty than appears here (his book runs to 685 pages). But how might politics and voting influence wealth divergence such that r does not become overly concentrated and grow at a rate that increasingly continues to outpace g, undermining the very structure on which the accepted values (what is wanted) of the society in question are based, undermining the structure to an unsustainable level, and the whole system collapses? Collapse is what Karl Marx predicted.
Was Marx wrong? “Not yet,” says Louis Menand in a recent New Yorker article:
“Marx was also not wrong about the tendency of workers’ wages to stagnate as income for the owners of capital rises. For the first sixty years of the nineteenth century—the period during which he began writing “Capital”—workers’ wages in Britain and France were stuck at close to subsistence levels. It can be difficult now to appreciate the degree of immiseration in the nineteenth-century industrial economy. In one period in 1862, the average workweek in a Manchester factory was eighty-four hours.”
And wages are once again at stagnation, benefits at a minimum, if any level at all, pensions something your grandfather once had, and if you’re an adjunct instructor, your 84 hours are made up working on eight different campuses simultaneously.
“How we think and evaluate,” said S. I. Hayakawa in his Introduction to “The Use and Misuse of Language” (1962), is inextricably bound up with how we talk.
“If our spoken evaluations are hasty and ill-considered, it is likely that our unspoken ones are even more so….the unexamined key-words in our thought processes, whether ‘fish’ or ‘free enterprise’ or ‘the military mind’ or ‘the Jews’ or ‘creeping socialism’ or ‘bureaucracy,’ can, by creating the illusion of meaning where no clear-cut meaning exists, hinder and misdirect our thought” (viii).
The use of “unexamined key-words” permeating portals such as Twitter and Facebook, both of which are largely venues for “unspoken evaluations,” provides a contemporary example of Hayakawa’s example of how
“all prejudices work in just this way – racial, ideological, religious, natural, occupational, or regional. Like the man who ‘doesn’t like fish,’ there are the ideologically muscle-bound who ‘don’t like the profit system’ whether it manifests itself in a corner newsstand or in General Motors, or who ‘reject government intervention in business’ no matter what kind of intervention in what kinds of business for what purpose” (viii).
Hayakawa was concerned not with the “correctness” of people’s talk, but with “the adequacy of their language as a ‘map’ of the ‘territory’ of experience being talked about” (vii).
That territory is now pockmarked with unhappiness and anxiety across the whole landscape of voting experience, as the “keywords” of its mapping search features illustrate: “pussy,” “locker room,” “wall.”
Where a pussy might be an opening in a locker room wall. I had a bit of juvenile fun on my own Facebook page recently. And it’s always interesting to see what keywords incite what reaction when they trigger the unspoken. I was working with satire and sarcasm (one difference being that satire usually has a target, while sarcasm is closer to farce, which is comedy without a target). Anyway, here are the posts I put up over the span of a few days:
Trump tries to woo Nobel Committee, says, “I’m going to make poetry rhyme again!”
Trump to dig moat around his locker room and fill it with crocodile tears.
English majors organizing to protest musician winning Nobel for Literature.
Trump to build wall around his locker room to keep Media out; meanwhile, Hillary advocates for Locker Rooms Without Borders.
Trump to defecting GOP supporters: “Wait! I’m going to make Mud Wrestling great again!”
Trump to open new restaurant franchise called Locker Rooms, to compete with Hooters.
Leak reveals Trump’s locker room not as big as he claimed.
Regent University to name new Locker Room after Trump. Says Robertson, “We’re going to make locker rooms great again!”
Trump on the Issues: “I thought they said ‘tissues.’ Stay on the tissues. I didn’t know what the hell they were talking about!
But where do the fundamental keywords that move thought from the unspoken sphere to a spoken realm come from?
In “Love’s Body” (1966), Norman O. Brown suggested words and ideas come from the body. Thus, we have a “head of state,” who sits at “the seat of government,” trying to control the “body politic”:
“’A Multitude of men are made One person.’ The idea of a people is the idea of a corporation, and the idea of a corporation is the idea of a juristic person. ‘This is more than Consent, or Concord: it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person.’ Out of many, one: a logical impossibility; a piece of poetry, or symbolism; an enacted or incarnate metaphor; a poetic creation. The Commonwealth is ‘an Artificial Man,’ a body politic, ‘in which,’ the Soveraignty is an ‘Artificial Soul; the Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall Joynts,” etc. Does this ‘Artificiall Man,’ this ‘Feigned or Artificiall Person, make ‘a real Unitie of them all”? Are juristic persons real, or only legal fictions, personae fictae? ‘Analogy with the living person and shift of meaning are the essence of the mode of legal statement which refers to corporate bodies.’ Is the shift of meaning real? Does the metaphor accomplish a metamorphosis? ‘The Pacts and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation.” Or like the hoc est corpus meum, This is my body, pronounced by God in the Redemption. Is there a real transubstantiation? Is there a miracle in the communion of the mortal God, the great leviathan; a miracle which gives life to the individual communicants also? For so-called ‘real,’ ‘living,’ ‘natural’ persons, individual persons, are not natural but juristic persons, personae fictae, social creations, no more real than corporations.”
Hobbes, Leviathan, 3-4, 136, 143.
Wolff, “On the Nature of Legal Persons.” Hart, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence.
We seek to have a more well rounded, educated and knowledgable government to represent us. Our alluvial attention contradicts this desire placing us on course for representatives secreting their ideals and developing a marketed voice.
Communities are not intelligent and don’t seek to be so. They simply slip from one geographical point to another under pressure from a tightening world. A “Regular Joe” has little or no idea of how to correctly interpret political information and so accepts the line promoted as true, in much the same way as accepting a religious stand-point.
( The ” Regular Joe” referred to here is by no means the ” Not so regular Joe” AKA Linker)
The writings you refer to are really interesting and I will seek out the publications. Maybe Joe you could make your next book one on ” Thinking”?
Books exist on “Thinking” but it would be good to have a reference presented by an obvious talent such as yourself. Your way of bringing an idea forward cannot be ignored and as for thinking, well if we all spent as much time thinking as we apparently do following, then the world would progress.B
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Thanks, B. Very generous. I want to touch on media as influence and persuasion, too. The thought of media. Different forms of media, as McLuhan defines media, a kind of technology, where technology is defined as an extension of one of the senses – he saw the computer as an extension of the central nervous system (as Joyce thought of television as the Charge of the Light Brigade!). But note all the references back to the body (including the senses). Anyway, how any of it creates or informs thought, prejudices, preferences, etc. Much anxiety being created – what we need are posts that relax! Thanks for reading and commenting!
Sobering … inequality reaches such an extreme that democracy is at risk of becoming a fantasy …
The internet affords distance, but the circus is painful to watch. Can democracy be regarded as a process towards expanding the consciousness of the collective? I don’t know that inborn physical reflexes can be overcome. They go deep, like animal lore in our cells.
We should become more artificial, Zizek says. The true ecologist loves garbage, he goes on. One of my favorite segments. In one sense, he’s saying something similar to Cornel West when West talks about perfection and the disappointments of Romanticism: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iGCfiv1xtoU
A salad of ideas, tastes, nourishment in fragments. Interesting. Neither vegetarian nor… what’s the other one? The dish is dislocated in terms of its references, yet it speaks of self ignorance, huge non- reflection. NO wonder the polls and pundits can predict nothing, but worse than that, the disconnect is from ourselves! Making poetry rhyme again? By decree? Not far from likely! The inmates are in charge of the asylum, no doubt about it. Everywhere. Maybe the rational has to be banned ( read binned) to recover something we hardly remember.
Omnivorous (the other one) ? … (inmates of) Marat/Sade? … Mosaic thought, against linear. “dish is dislocated”: you mean removed so far from its place of origin as to be unintelligible? Well, the so-called mind/body split, where it all began?